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ABSTRACT: This paper examines the impact of interactions with welfare institutions on the political partici-
pation of long-term unemployed youth in two cities. We assess the role of resource redistribution and of 
political learning on engagement in protest activities. We use a unique dataset of long-term unemployed 
youth to predict the probability that long-term unemployed youth participate in protest activities and be-
come politically alienated as a result of their interactions with the state. Our study suggests that the impact 
of staid aid on political participation comes from providing services through the unemployment office and 
the social aid office rather than from direct payments. However, we do not find strong evidence revealing a 
process of political learning, as political alienation does not seem to mediate the effect of interactions with 
 
 Results presented in this paper have been obtained within the project “Youth, Unemployment, and 
Exclusion in Europe: A Multidimensional Approach to Understanding the Conditions and Prospects for 
Social and Political Integration of Young Unemployed” (YOUNEX). This project was funded by the Euro-
pean Commission under the 7th Framework Programme (grant agreement no. 216122). 
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the state on protest. The most important finding of our study is that the connection between welfare insti-
tutions and political learning is context-dependent. We find a differential effect of interactions with the 
unemployment office and with the social aid office across cities.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Research on political participation has traditionally looked at the impact of individual-
level factors such as socio-demographic characteristics, socio-economic status, educa-
tion, political attitudes, and so forth (Nie et al., 1979; Verba and Nie, 1972; Verba et al., 
1995). There is an important missing actor in this literature: the state. The role of the 
state is seldom looked at in studies of political participation. Franklin (1996, 2004), for 
example, has done so for electoral participation. Students of social movements, in con-
trast, have paid much attention to the role of the state as encouraging or discouraging 
collective action. Political opportunity theorists, in particular, have put that as a key issue 
on their research agenda (see Kriesi, 2004; Meyer, 2004: for reviews). In both cases, 
however, the state is taken as a general context that may change the conditions under 
which people get involved in politics or moderate the effect of some individual-level 
characteristics on their propensity to participate. 
In this paper we examine the role of the state by focusing on a more specific aspect: 
how welfare institutions contribute to political learning, therefore ultimately leading to 
an increased (or decreased) engagement in politics. More specifically, we look at how 
interacting with the state may work as an incentive (or disincentive) for long-term un-
employed youth to get involved in protest activities. We expect that interactions dimin-
ish the political alienation of unemployed youth when they obtain the services they are 
entitled to because they learn that they can successfully enforce a demand on the state 
and that the state is responsive to their demands. Thus, in this case, interactions with 
the state should positively contribute to their overall involvement in politics and to their 
political participation in protest. Protest is a non-targeted voice-based form of participa-
tion (Teorell et al., 2007), which is particularly interesting when looking at the political 
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behavior of young people, as they are more attracted to this form of participation than 
other cohorts (Dalton, 1996; Henn et al., 2002). 
Especially in times of crisis like the ones in which we conducted our study, the welfare 
state has a buffering effect on the situation of resource-poor groups which comes from 
money transfers (Anderson and Hecht, 2014). The unemployed, and even more so young 
long-term unemployed, are one such groups. This effect also manifests itself on political 
participation. Previous research has focused on the impact of resources, especially eco-
nomic ones, on the political participation of unemployed people (Burden and Wichowsky 
2012; Kinder and Kiewiet 1979; Schlozman and Verba 1979). Examining how the interac-
tions between them and certain state institutions may encourage or discourage their 
political engagement is another way – much understudied so far – to study the complex 
relation between political behavior and its institutional context. 
We link our main argument to the literature on political learning (Soss, 1999; Mettler, 
2002; Kumlin and Stadelmann-Steffen, 2014; Campbell, 2012). In this regard, we argue 
that the impact of the welfare state is not so much due to direct money transfers, but 
depends mainly on interactions with street-level bureaucrats and on obtaining or not 
social services and benefits. In these interactions, individuals learn, firstly, whether the 
state is responsive and, secondly, whether they can obtain something from it. People 
then infer about the role of the state based on such interactions. Furthermore, we in-
vestigate the role of these learned political attitudes for political participation. More 
specifically we examine whether political efficacy and cynicism, which have been shown 
in previous research to be strong predictors of low levels of political engagement 
(Almond and Verba, 1963; Pateman, 1970; Bandura, 1997), mediate the relationship be-
tween interactions with welfare institutions and, more generally, with the state and po-
litical participation, most notably the use of protest activities. These are two key compo-
nents of political alienation, which has often been attributed to both the youngsters and 
the unemployed, and even more so to young unemployed. We focus on protest – a non-
targeted voice-based form of participation (Teorell et al., 2007) – as it is a particularly 
important form of participation when looking at the political behavior of young people, 
as they are more attracted to this form of participation than other cohorts (Dalton, 1996; 
Henn et al., 2002).1 
 
1 Teorell et al. (2007) distinguishing between five main forms of political participation according to 
three criteria: voting activities (exit-based and representational), consumer participation (exit-based 
and non-representational), party activities (non-targeted, voice-based, and representational), protest 
activities (targeted, voice-based, and non-representational, and contacting activities (targeted and 
voice-based). 
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To be sure, similar arguments have been advanced in the literature. However, previ-
ous research in this field has done so by comparing different resource-poor populations, 
such a single mothers or disabled (Soss, 1999; Soss, 2004). Moreover, most existing stud-
ies deal with the U.S. (Campbell, 2003; Lawless and Fox, 2001; Mettler, 2002; Soss, 1999). 
We compare a single population in two cities and their interactions with two state agen-
cies. The two cities – Cologne and Geneva – belong to the same unemployment regimes, 
but in their latest reforms they have taken different paths, Germany introducing more 
workfare measures and Switzerland developing measures aiming at both professional 
and social inclusion. The two different kinds of welfare institutions – the unemployment 
office and the social aid office – allow us to compare social policies that are insurance 
based or means-tested an important difference highlighted in previous studies (Mettler 
and Stonecash, 2008; Swartz et al., 2009). Our analysis is based on data from a random 
sample of long-term unemployed youth in the two cities retrieved in an EU-funded pro-
ject. 
 
 
2. Welfare institutions and long-term unemployment 
 
Changes in the labor market over the last 20 years have affected the ability of unem-
ployment policies to offer protection to certain workers. In particular in the case of 
youth, these policies appear as inadequate when they limit access to outsiders, that is, 
when they fail to take into account the increased flexibility of the labor market. The wel-
fare state and, more specifically, unemployment regulations face a number of challenges 
in reaching outsiders and offering them employment protection (Clegg, 2007). The atyp-
ical employment – most frequent among youth, women, and low-qualified workers – 
limits access to unemployment benefits because of a failure to fulfilling the access crite-
ria (Bonoli, 2009; Clasen and Clegg, 2006).  
Moreover, a central aspect of our analysis relates to the reforms of unemployment 
policies, which have started a process of re-commodification characterized by less ben-
efits and more obligations related to the provision of unemployment benefits (Arcanjo, 
2012). Access to unemployment benefits has become more limited and the duration of 
benefits was shortened. This allows to reduce the cost of the welfare state, but also to 
address the neoliberal claim that unemployment benefits create disincentives to work. 
In this respect, these changes are not a mere downsizing of the existing unemployment 
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benefits, but they represent a change of paradigm, shifting away from a conception of 
social protection offered by the welfare state and the idea of employment as “socialized 
work” to the new standard of “employable individual” (Zimmermann, 2006). While in 
the former the state offers protection against temporary or permanent incapacity to 
work (due to ageing, illness, accidents, or job loss) based on solidarity and collective pro-
tection of workers against the odds inherent to a paid labor society, in the latter its major 
role is to ensure that people go back to work and, if needed, enhance their employability 
through active measures while providing short-term financial support. Furthermore, the 
ideal of the “employable individual” focuses on reinforcing individuals’ work ethic 
through workfare measures that force individuals into job, be they underpaid or below 
working standards (Bonvin, 2008). 
In this new conception of the role of the state, unemployment represents a highly 
stigmatizing status (Zimmermann, 2006). This change can be related to the discussion of 
conditionality in the British context (Dwyer and Ellison, 2009) and the emergence of new 
paternalism in the American context (Mead, 1998). In this view, the state is conditioning 
the provision of resources to the compliance of the beneficiaries with expected behav-
iors, in the case of unemployed youth enhancing their employability or agreeing with the 
ethic of work. The literature on political learning draws from this view to assess the ex-
tent to which the state is telling the beneficiaries of social measures how to live or to 
decide what is best for them (Campbell, 2012; Mettler, 2002; Soss, 2004). 
 
 
3. Social policies, political learning, and political participation 
 
Since the precursory work by Skocpol (1992), research on policy feedback analyzes 
the effects of public policies on political processes. As part of this research, some re-
searchers work more specifically on the effects of public policies on citizens’ political 
participation with the assumption that “[p]olicies impact citizenship because they en-
courage and facilitate participation by some, but discourage or exclude participation by 
others” (Schneider and Ingram, 2005: 27). Research working on the effect of policy de-
sign on citizens’ political participation is more limited and mainly focused on the Ameri-
can context with the notable exception of a recently published edited volume on the 
impact of welfare policies for citizens’ democratic participation in Europe (Kumlin and 
Stadelmann-Steffen, 2014).  
Our study contributes to the literature by adding to the research working on policy 
feedback in relation to the European welfare state and, more specifically, by offering an 
in-depth comparison of policy feedback in the Swiss and the German unemployment 
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regimes. Thus, this allows us to test the effect of targeted public policies on similar pop-
ulations, namely long-term unemployed youth living in a European city. In fact, in our 
views the main drawback of the literature working on policy feedback and political par-
ticipation is the comparison of often very different populations targeted by specific pub-
lic policies, for instance in the oft cited research by Soss (1999; 2004) the comparison 
confronts ‘welfare mothers’ and ‘disabled workers’. In a latter work, the question of self-
selection is addressed by comparing poor citizens benefitting from three means-tested 
measures two of which target families and one based on public housing assistance 
(Bruch et al., 2010). But still we think ruling out the self-selection effect can be improved 
by working on a single population. In fact, poverty among families may be related to lone 
parenthood – in particular to single mothers, while housing assistance may cover a 
broader range of poor citizens and this, in turn may affect the outcomes found in terms 
of political participation. 
According to research on policy feedback, the design of social policy affects benefi-
ciaries’ relationship to the state as well as the way they perceive their capacity to act 
politically (Mettler and Stonecash, 2008; Schneider and Ingram, 1993; Soss, 2004). In this 
vein, Schneider and Ingram (1993: 340) note that “[p]olicy teaches lessons about the 
type of groups people belong to, what they deserve from government, and what is ex-
pected of them. […] Citizens encounter and internalize the messages not only through 
observation of politics and media coverage but also through their direct, personal expe-
riences with public policy.” In this perspective, social policies vary with regard to condi-
tions for entitlement and in the way users, clients, or customers are treated by public 
institutions, in turn, contribute to beneficiaries’ political learning (Kumlin, 2002). In this 
perspective, political learning is a process of attitude formation in relation to interactions 
with the welfare state. In other words, it is part of adult political socialization.  
Among those who have studied how social policies contribute to shaping political 
voices, Soss (1999; 2004) shows how social policies’ designs convey messages to benefi-
ciaries in terms of deservingness and undeservingness through encounters with social 
workers and procedures of access, control, and demand-making. The policy design “es-
tablish baseline terms of power and voice for interactions between clients and officials 
that, ultimately, unfold through an open-ended, political process” (Soss, 2004: : 302). 
Clients, through their interactions with state officials, engage in a process of political 
learning and come to perceive themselves as legitimate claimants or not, in addition to 
acquiring resources (money in particular): “[e]xperiences in welfare programs provide 
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individuals with cognitive resources that they use to make sense of government as a 
whole and to evaluate the effectiveness of political participation in general” (Soss 2004: 
308). Moreover, contacts within this specific state agency are perceived as representa-
tive, and since beneficiaries tend to see the state as “one big entity” these experiences 
shape their relationship to the state and contribute to their feeling of political efficacy. 
In brief, these experiences with the welfare state contribute to political participation 
through political learning and socialization. 
A number of further works have put forward similar arguments. For example, Lawless 
and Fox (2001) have studied both economic hardship and contacts with government 
agents of urban poor, showing that experiences with public policies and public agents 
affect turnout at the poll. The authors argue that urban poor’s understanding of how the 
government works and the state perceived political responsiveness are affected by con-
frontations with social workers. Moreover, concerning the specific design of public poli-
cies, Swartz et al. (2009) have shown that youth who receive means-tested benefits are 
less likely to vote, whereas youth receiving universal benefits are not less likely to vote 
than other youngsters. Yet, the authors have found that the design of public policies 
affect their voting behaviors, but not their engagement in voluntary associations. Bruch 
et al. (2010) have compared beneficiaries of three means-tested programs and found 
that the effects of means-tested programs vary across policy designs. Empowering 
means-tested programs can have a positive effect on civic engagement, although they 
do not have the expected positive effect on political participation, while paternalist pro-
grams have the expected detrimental effect on both civic and political participation. 
Lastly, neutral programs have no effect. However, these studies compare social groups 
that may differ also with regard to socioeconomic resources and political attitudes. This 
may produce biased findings, as stressed in a recent literature review by Campbell 
(2012). Including a number of controls in the analyses does not rule out the possibility 
of omitted variable bias, leading to selection effects instead of public policy effects. By 
comparing the same group – namely, long-term unemployed youth – interacting with 
the welfare state in two different cities, we believe that we reduce the self-selection. 
Although one may argue that youth unemployment is not structurally similar in the two 
contexts, we think that we offer an improvement to existing research comparing differ-
ent groups. 
Mettler (2002) distinguishes the effects of payments and services from those of rules 
and procedures. Her model includes two causal mechanisms. On the one hand, pay-
ments and services contribute to resources that enhance the capacity to act (referred to 
as civic capacity). On the other hand, both payments/services and rules/procedure have 
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interpretative effects on political attitudes (called civic predispositions). In terms of re-
sources, public policies create incentives for participation related to the defense of ben-
efits, while they offer a venue for political learning through the evaluation of the gov-
ernment responsiveness and the effectiveness of participation (Mettler and Soss, 2004). 
Furthermore, these rules are enacted by the civil servants and perceived by beneficiaries 
during encounters with social workers, thus, affecting both internal and external political 
efficacy (Soss, 1999). On the one hand, obtaining services raises internal political efficacy 
(which we call here simply political efficacy) since it offers clues on citizens’ capacity to 
influence the state. On the other hand, placing demands that are not fulfilled informs 
citizens about the responsiveness of the state or, rather, the lack thereof in this regard 
it reduces external political efficacy (which we call here political cynicism).  
We examine whether public institutions in charge of implementing unemployment 
policies contribute to engagement in politics through a process of political learning. The 
existing research shows that welfare institutions that deal with the provision of job 
search or financial assistance are among the less empowering public institutions (Kumlin, 
2002). Clients of these institutions have no or few possibilities of exiting and turning to 
alternative agencies to fulfill their needs and they usually depend on a discretionary de-
cision to obtain the services they demand. Yet, the degree of discretionary power de-
pends on how public policies shape the civil servant-client relationship and how precise 
they are in determining under which conditions one may obtain specific services. In the 
case of unemployment, the provision of financial assistance is often strictly defined by 
law, but street-level bureaucrats may have some margin of action with regards to sanc-
tioning. In other words, they may cut or reduce financial assistance for non-compliance 
with obligations, but the access to other services such as active measures may be prone 
to more discretionary power. Previous studies show that civil servants working in unem-
ployment offices operate a screening of unemployed persons (Dingeldey, 2007; Ehrler 
and Sager, 2011). In particular, they evaluate the employability of unemployed persons 
and may assign them either to measures aiming at enhancing qualifications or at con-
trolling the work ethic. 
We therefore assume that long-term unemployed youth experience different interac-
tions with the state depending on the discretionary power of street-level bureaucrats. 
We test the discretionary power of bureaucrats by analyzing long-term unemployed 
youth accounts of receiving or not services they think they were entitled. We expect that 
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these experiences, which are related to obtaining or not the services from welfare insti-
tutions, contribute to their political learning by telling unemployed youth whether they 
may have an influence on the state (political efficacy) and whether the latter is respon-
sive to their demands (political cynicism). Ultimately, these attitudes learned through 
the interaction with the state should contribute to political participation (Campbell, 
2003; Lawless and Fox, 2001; Mettler, 2002; Soss, 1999). 
Unlike previous research, which has looked at political participation in general or fo-
cused on voting activities, we examine the impact of welfare institutions on protest ac-
tivities. According to Verba et al. (1995) protesting requires limited resources and per-
mits the transmission of more specific messages related to dissatisfaction with one’s 
personal situation. Thus, it is an important mean of participation for the less well-off. We 
therefore focus on protest activities, which are a non-targeted voice-based form of par-
ticipation (Teorell et al., 2007), and study the impact of welfare institutions on the en-
gagement of long-term unemployed youth in this important form of political participa-
tion. We look at whether and to what extent their engagement in protest activities is 
related to state payments and services. More specifically, inspired by the works men-
tioned earlier, we advance two hypotheses: a first one concerning the direct impact of 
payments and a second one referring to the indirect impact of services. 
Firstly, concerning the role of payments, we examine the (direct) effect of financial 
resources for the political participation of unemployed youth. We expect that receiving 
financial aid from the state as a main source of income increases political participation, 
net of the effect of other socio-economic resources such as education and of socio-de-
mographic characteristics. 
Secondly, concerning the role of services, we look at their interpretative (indirect) ef-
fects by analyzing the process of political learning. If we are confronted with a process 
of political learning, not obtaining services to which one is entitled or believes to have 
right to should affect political participation via its impact on political attitudes. More 
specifically, we expect that not obtaining services from the unemployment office or from 
the social aid office drives political alienation, as visible in lower levels of political efficacy 
and higher levels of political cynicism. This, in turn, should lead to lower levels of political 
engagement, as we expect that lower political efficacy and higher political cynicism hin-
der engagement in protest activities. 
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4. Unemployment policies in Germany and Switzerland 
 
Since we are comparing two cities which, moreover, belong to federal countries, much 
of what is going on concerning state aid to unemployed and unemployment policies 
takes place at the local level. However, even in federal countries, local policies are influ-
enced by the broader national context and regulations. Therefore we need to describe 
such a broader context in Germany and Switzerland, which define how welfare institu-
tions in Cologne and Geneva deal with long-term unemployed youth. 
The unemployment system was reformed in Germany during the early 2000s under 
what has been referred to as the Hartz reforms (see Dingeldey, 2011a; Dingeldey, 2011b; 
Fleckenstein, 2012; Kemmerling and Bruttel, 2006:  for discussions of the Hartz reforms). 
These reforms resulted in the merging of the long-term unemployment benefits with the 
social aid. Thus, unemployment is handled through a two-tier system, the so-called un-
employment insurance I and II. The former represents unemployment benefits, while 
the latter is merged with social aid. The former tier focuses on short-term unemployed 
and their reinsertion in the labor market, while the latter aims to reinforce the ethic to 
work and force unemployed citizens to accept any work offered, be it below minimal 
wage, a one-euro-job to complement social benefits, or community work (Dingeldey, 
2011a; Fleckenstein, 2012; Kemmerling and Bruttel, 2006). Moreover, while unemploy-
ment insurance I is based on contributions and provides a replacement rate of 60 per-
cent (67 percent in case of dependent children), unemployment insurance II is means-
tested and financed through taxes, and beneficiaries receive a flat-rate of 359 euros. As 
a result of the merging of long-term unemployment insurance and social aid, this second 
tier has become the dominant scheme in the provision of assistance and services to un-
employed in Germany (Dingeldey, 2011b). It focuses on control and discipline, and intro-
duce a recommodification and workfare for long-term unemployed in Germany 
(Fleckenstein, 2012). 
The unemployment insurance was introduced later in Switzerland than in European 
countries (in 1982, as compared to 1927 in Germany). The latest reform reduced access 
to unemployment benefits and the duration of unemployment benefits for certain 
groups, but it did not integrate the different institutions providing assistance to unem-
ployed persons (see Champion, 2011; Ehrler and Sager, 2011; Perret et al., 2007: for 
presentation of the Swiss unemployment regime). There is a multi-tier unemployment 
system, whereby the unemployment insurance is located at the national level and the 
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social aid at the local level (Ehrler and Sager, 2011). More specifically, it is built around 
three mains instruments. Firstly, the unemployment insurance is built around two di-
mensions: an inclusion and control (Perret et al., 2007). It includes generous passive 
measures with a high replacement rate for unemployment benefits (between 70 and 80 
percent of former wage), but also a tight control and sanctioning procedure to impose 
compliance with job-search requirements. Moreover, it provides for active measures in 
order to enhance the skills and acquire further training of jobless people. Secondly, social 
aid, which is means-tested, offers minimal income, and active measures are often not 
used, although they formally exist (Champion, 2011). When they are used, they are dis-
cussed and agreed upon between social aid beneficiaries and social workers (Ehrler and 
Sager, 2011). Thus, social aid beneficiaries are seldom forced to participate in any meas-
ure related to activation policies and a third of them are active in the labor market but 
earn very low wages complemented by social aid (Ehrler and Sager, 2011). Thirdly, the 
invalidity insurance offers a minimal income to persons who are deemed unable to work. 
Thus, we are comparing two welfare states belonging to the continental type, but 
which have taken different paths in the last decades. On the one hand, the reforms of 
the German welfare state, which used to be the ideal-typical case of income protection 
and employment-centered unemployment benefits (Gallie and Paugam, 2000), complied 
with the OECD recommendations: the Hartz reforms have limited passive transfers and 
enforced drastic activation measures imposing work-for-welfare measures (Kemmerling 
and Bruttel, 2006). On the other hand, the Swiss unemployment regime, which used to 
be largely underdeveloped until the 1990s due to the low unemployment rate (Ehrler 
and Sager, 2011) and the use of working permits to reduce foreign workers in times of 
crisis (Bonoli and Mach, 2001), increased the integration dimension of unemployment 
policies through the development of active measures, particularly in Geneva, so that the 
unemployment offices favor integration over control, which are the two strongholds of 
the Swiss unemployment regime (Perret et al., 2007). Moreover, Cinalli and Giugni’s 
(2013) typology of youth unemployment regimes accounts for the specific position of Co-
logne and Geneva with regard to the dimension of unemployment regulations.2 Specifically, 
they situate Cologne in the exclusive camp, while Geneva falls close to the inclusive pole. 
 
2 Cinalli and Giugni (2013; see further Cinalli and Giugni 2010, Giugni et al. 2009) distinguish be-
tween two main dimensions of unemployment regimes: an unemployment regulations dimension re-
ferring to specific conditions of access to rights for the unemployed as well as to the obligations at-
tached to full enjoyment of these rights (which may be either inclusive or exclusive), and a labor market 
regulations dimension referring to state intervention in the labor market (which may be either flexible 
or rigid). 
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The two cities, therefore, display different approaches in the ways local authorities deal 
with youth unemployment, as reflected in their position in this typology. 
Given the characteristics of the two unemployment regimes, we expect that the com-
parison of Cologne and Geneva will result in more political alienation in Cologne than in 
Geneva. More specifically, interactions with the social aid office in Cologne should result 
in unemployed youth learning that they cannot obtain services from the state and that 
the state is unresponsive to their demands due to the importance of workfare policies. 
This, in turn, should result in a more limited engagement in protest activities in Cologne. 
 
 
5. Data and methods 
 
Our analysis is based on a telephone survey on representative samples of long-term 
unemployed youth aged between 18 and 34 conducted in the context of the EU-funded 
project “Youth, Unemployment, and Exclusion in Europe: A Multidimensional Approach 
to Understanding the Conditions and Prospects for Social and Political Integration of 
Young Unemployed” (YOUNEX). The survey was conducted in seven cities: Cologne (Ger-
many), Geneva (Switzerland), Karlstad (Sweden), Kielce (Poland), Lisbon (Portugal), Lyon 
(France), and Turin (Italy).3 In this paper, however, we only use data on Cologne and Ge-
neva. The interviews were conducted between October and December 2009 in Cologne and 
between March and October 2010 in Geneva. 
Next we describe the operationalization of the variables included in the analyses. Pro-
test activities – our dependent variable – are measured as having taken part in street 
demonstrations during the 12 months prior to the interview. It is a dichotomous variable 
coded 1 for respondents who have participated in demonstrations and 0 otherwise. 
Regarding the independent variables, related to the welfare state and public institu-
tions, we measure state financial aid with a dichotomous variable based on a question 
asking for the main source of income of respondents. When the main source of income 
is either unemployment benefits or social aid the variable is coded 1, otherwise it is 
coded 0. Receiving due services at the unemployment office or at the social aid office is 
a three state categorical variable distinguishing, first, those who did not have contacts 
with the institution, the reference category (coded 0), and then those who received the 
 
3 The study in Portugal was financed with own means. 
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services (coded 1) from those who did not receive services that they believe to be enti-
tled to (coded 2).  
Political efficacy and political cynicism are our intermediary variables. They are meant 
to capture the overarching concept of political alienation. Unlike other usages of this 
concept in the literature, which sees it as a multidimensional concept (Finifter, 1970; 
Olsen, 1969), we confine it to two attitudinal aspects: internal and external political ef-
ficacy, and call the former more straightforwardly political efficacy and the latter political 
cynicism. Political efficacy is measured through a question asking whether persons like 
themselves have an influence on politics, responses are totally disagree, disagree, agree, 
and totally agree. We recoded the latter two as 1 and the former two as 0. Political cyn-
icism is based on a question asking whether political parties are only interested in their 
votes, not in their opinions. Responses include the same four options and were coded as 
1 when respondents agreed or totally agreed and 0 when they disagreed or totally disa-
greed. 
We include in the models a number of control relating to civic skills and political atti-
tudes, which have been found in previous research to impact on political participation 
(Verba et al., 1995): political interest, associational membership, and left-right self-
placement. Political interest is a dichotomous variable based on a subjective measure 
asking to what extent the respondent is interested in politics. Possible answers range 
from not at all to very interested. We then created a dummy variable, whereby 1 indi-
cates political interest and 0 no political interest. Associational membership is measured 
through a question asking whether the respond is a member of a number of organiza-
tions (trade unions, religious organization, cooperatives, social movement organizations, 
or other civil society organizations). We coded 1 respondents who are members of at 
least one of these associations and 0 all those who are not members of any association. 
Left-right self-placement is measured through a categorical variable based on a self-an-
choring scale ranging from 0 to 10. We coded as left those who place themselves from 0 
to 4, as right those who place themselves from 6 to 10, and as center or no placement 
those who placed themselves on 5 or do not know where to place themselves. 
We also control for variables related to socio-demographic characteristics of respond-
ents that influence resources for political participation: sex, nationality, age, and educa-
tion. Sex and nationality are dichotomous variables; sex is coded 1 for female and 0 for 
male, while nationality is coded 1 for national citizens and 0 for foreigners. Age is a con-
tinuous variable ranging from 18 to 35 rescaled to 0-1 for the logistic regression. Lastly, 
we measure education through a categorical variable coded 0 for those having achieved 
below secondary education, 1 for those with a secondary education, and 2 for those with 
a tertiary education. 
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The analysis proceeds in three steps. Firstly, we compare the situation of unemployed 
youth in the two cities with respect to three key aspects for our main argument: their 
financial situation, their interactions with the state at the unemployment office and at 
the social aid office, and the perceived discrimination related to the status of unem-
ployed. Secondly, we run four logistic regression models assessing the effects of our var-
iables of interest on protest activities. The four logistic regression models aimed to as-
sess the effect of interactions with the state, political efficacy, and political cynicism on 
protest activities. The first two models imply similar mechanisms in the two cities, with 
or without the control of the two intervening variables. The last two models include in-
teraction terms between welfare institutions and city: one for the unemployment office 
and one for the social aid office. In all four variables Cologne is coded 1. These interaction 
terms allow us to compare the two cities, as we expect the effect of welfare institutions 
to vary across cities, given their different institutional setting. We will show the results 
of this analysis in the forms of predicted probabilities and the full models are presented 
in appendix 2. Thirdly, we will examine if and to what extent the probability for young 
unemployed to be engaged in protest activities change depending on the interactions 
with the two types of welfare institutions, both in Cologne and Geneva. This should allow 
us to test our hypotheses about the impact of state aid on the political participation of 
unemployed youth, specifically in protest activities. 
 
 
6. Findings 
 
We first examine whether the features of the welfare systems in the two countries 
and cities reflect on the specific situation of unemployed youth. Table 1 compares their 
situation in the two cities with respect to three key aspects: financial situation and diffi-
culties, interactions with the state at the unemployment office, interactions with the 
state at the unemployment office, and perceived discrimination related to unemploy-
ment. Of course, unemployment policies and welfare regimes do not fully explain the 
personal situation of unemployment, which also depends on other factors. However, it 
has been shown that the former are an important determinant of the latter (Gallie and 
Paugam, 2000). 
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As we can see, there are important differences across the two cities. We observe in 
particular significant differences on three counts. Firstly, concerning the financial situa-
tion, young unemployed who do not receive state aid are significantly more numerous 
in Geneva than in Cologne, although the percentages are rather low in both cities. How-
ever, many more people in Cologne have said that they find it hard to cope on present 
income, most likely a result of the high replacement rate applied in Switzerland and the 
introduction of the means-tested unemployment insurance for long-term unemployed 
in Germany. At the same time, young unemployed in Cologne are much more likely to 
live on unemployment benefits, while for a substantial share in Geneva the main income 
comes from elsewhere. Secondly, significantly more young unemployed in Cologne did 
not receive services from the unemployment office, while the share of those who had 
no contact with it is higher in Geneva. Thirdly, similar differences can be seen with regard 
to interactions with the state at the social aid office. Again, the number of people (in 
relative terms) who did not get the services from the office is significantly higher in Co-
logne, while the proportion of those who did not have contacts with is higher in Geneva. 
In this case, however, we also observe a significant difference for those who received 
the services, who are more numerous in Cologne. We should also note that in both cities 
only a minority of people have had contacts with the social aid office. This might contrast 
with some other countries which display higher levels of unemployment and are not so 
well endowed in terms of social protection.  
Finally, no statistically significant differences can be seen concerning the experience 
of discrimination due to unemployment. In both cities the number of young unemployed 
feeling they have been discriminated is relatively low (somewhat higher in Cologne). 
However, in Cologne the average degree of perceived social stigma attached to unem-
ployment is significantly stronger.4 
 
 
4 We also tested for differences related to sociodemographic characteristics that may account for 
differences in receiving state aid or having contacts with the state (results available upon demand). We 
find that the probability of receiving state financial aid increases with age in both cities. In relation to 
this, the younger ones are less likely to have contacts with the unemployment office, but no age differ-
ence is found for contacts with social aid. The age differences that we find may be related to the fact 
that the younger ones may not register at the unemployment office because they are not entitled to 
unemployment benefits. More interesting for us is the fact that educational differences account for con-
tacts with the state. Surprisingly, the more educated (tertiary education) are less likely to have contacts 
with the state in Cologne, while in Geneva it is the less educated and the foreigners that are less likely 
to have contacts with the state. In Cologne, the more educated are also less likely to have contacts with 
the social aid, whereas in Geneva the Swiss citizens are less likely to have these contacts. This may be 
related to the social stigma related to social aid that prevent specific group of the population from en-
tering a relationship with the institution. 
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Table 1 - The situation of unemployed youth in Cologne and Geneva (percentages) 
 Cologne Geneva 
Financial situation   
Not receiving state aid 10.82 16.73 
Finding it hard to cope on present income 65.25 37.72 
Main income    
  Unemployment benefits 79.80 53.74 
  Social aid 5.96 6.05 
  Family aid 5.63 9.25 
  Other 8.61 30.96 
   
Interactions with the state at the unemployment office   
No contact with it 11.48 22.06 
Received the services 50.16 48.40 
Did not receive the services 38.36 29.54 
   
Interactions with the state  at the social aid office   
No contact with it 62.62 78.29 
Received the services 21.64 11.74 
Did not receive the services 15.74 9.96 
   
Discrimination related to unemployment   
Experienced discrimination related to unemployment 15.41 10.68 
Perceived social stigma related to with unemployment 7.55 6.64 
 
Notes: Significant differences based on adjusted residuals (95% confidence intervals) are shown in bold. Perceived so-
cial stigma associated with unemployment is expressed as means (scale ranging from 0 to 12) and the difference is 
based on a t-test. 
 
Overall, the situation is slightly more negative in Cologne, where there is more finan-
cial hardship and more social stigma related to the status of unemployment. Regarding 
the relation to the state, long-term unemployed youth tend to be more in contact with 
state agency in Cologne, be it the unemployment office or the social aid. However, they 
also report more frequently that they did no obtain the services they think they were 
entitled to, and this holds for both the unemployment office and the social aid office. 
Turning to our focus on the impact of welfare institutions on the political participation 
of long-term unemployed youth, our first hypothesis links the political engagement of 
long-term unemployed youth to state financial aid. The findings concerning the effect of 
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financial state aid are straightforward: contrary to our expectation, engagement in pro-
test activities is not significantly related to receiving financial aid from the state. Table 2 
shows that the predicted probability of engaging in protest of those who receive or not 
state financial aid are not significantly different, both in Cologne and in Geneva. 
What about the other two variables referring to unemployed youth interacting with 
the state? Unlike for state financial aid, here we observe a statistically significant effect 
when we look at interactions with the unemployment office. We can get a grasp on dif-
ferences across cities by looking again at table 2, which also shows the probability of 
engaging in protest activities depending on the kind of interaction with the state, in each 
of the two cities, based on model 4 shown in table 2. We can see that the two welfare 
institutions play a different role in the two cities. More specifically, the unemployment 
office matters in Geneva, while the social aid office matters in Cologne. In both cases, 
the probability of engaging in protest activities are higher when one feels he or she has 
not received the services one is entitled to from the respective state office. This is true 
in Cologne these respondents are compared to those who had no contact and those who 
did receive the services, and in Geneva when we compare them to those who had no 
contact. In addition, in the latter city, the probability to engage in protest activities is 
also significantly higher for those who did receive the services from the unemployment 
office, as compared to those who did not have any contact. In brief, interacting with 
welfare institutions and, more specifically, not getting what one has right to from those 
institutions leads long-term unemployed youth to become more engaged in protest ac-
tivities. However, this also depends on which kind of institution we are talking about: 
the social aid office in Cologne and the unemployment office in Geneva.  
Next we turn to the role of the two intervening variables, namely political efficacy and 
political cynicism. Our second hypothesis links the political engagement of long-term un-
employed youth to the services provided by welfare institutions such as the unemploy-
ment office and the social aid office, via the intervening role of political alienation (lower 
political efficacy and higher political cynicism). Tables 3 and 4 show the probability of 
displaying high political efficacy, respectively high political cynicism, depending on the 
kind of interaction with the state, in each of the two cities. The two variables behave 
differently: political efficacy seems to be at least in part affected by interactions with 
welfare institutions (table 3), while political cynicism does not display any statistically 
significant differences in predicted probabilities (table 4). Concerning the former, it ap-
pears that those who did not receive the services from welfare institutions have a lower 
political efficacy – that is, they are more political alienated – then those who did get 
them (and also in part from those who had no contact). This is consistent with the exist-
ing literature discussed earlier (Soss, 1999; 2004). 
Partecipazione e conflitto, 8(3) 2015: 814-844, DOI: 10.1285/i20356609v8i3p814 
 
831 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2 - Probability of engaging in protest activities depending on interactions with the state (95% confi-
dence intervals in brackets) 
 Cologne Geneva 
Financial aid     
  Received 14.8 [.11, .19] 17.6 [.13, .22] 
  Not received 13.2 [.05, .21] 15.9 [.06, .25] 
     
Unemployment office     
  No contact 14.8 [.13, .24] 6.4 [-.01, .13] 
  Received services 12.6 [.03, .26] 16.8a [.11, .23] 
  Did not receive the services 17.0 [.02, .28] 22.5b [.14, .31] 
     
Social aid office     
  No contact 13.3 [.09, .18] 18.6 [.03, .27] 
  Received the services 10.3 [.02, .19] 14.1 [.07, .18] 
  Did not receive the services 26.9c [.14, .40] 14.8 [.10, .24] 
     
Notes: Based on Appendix 2 (model 4). 
a The predicted probability for those who received services from the unemployment office in Geneva is significantly 
different from that of those who had no contact (p = 0.0285). 
a The predicted probability for those who did not receive services from the unemployment office in Geneva is signifi-
cantly different from that of those who had no contact (p = 0.0035). 
c The predicted probability for those who did not receive services from social aid in Cologne is significantly different 
from that of those who had no contact (p = 0.0485) and from those who received the services (p = 0.0373). 
 
Table 3 - Probability of high political efficacy depending on interactions with the state (95% confidence 
intervals in brackets) 
 Cologne Geneva 
Unemployment office     
  No contact 36.2 [20.5, 52.0] 27.2 [15.9, 38.3] 
  Received the services 26.4 [18.9, 33.9] 39.2a [30.5, 47.9] 
  Did not receive the services 24.8 [16.4, 33.1] 31.2 [20.8, 41.6] 
Social aid office     
  No contact 25.0 [18.7, 31.3] 32.0 [25.5, 38.4] 
  Received the services 42.9b [30.1, 55.7] 40.5 [23.6, 57.5] 
  Did not receive the services 21.8 [9.7, 34.0] 39.1 [21.0, 57.3] 
     
Notes: Based on a logistic regression model with political efficacy as dependent variable, controlling for sex, nationality, 
age, education, financial difficulties, political interest, associational membership, left-right self-positioning, and city. 
The model also includes an interaction term between city and contacts with welfare institutions. 
a The predicted probability for those who received services from the unemployment office in Geneva is significantly 
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different from that of those who had no contact (p = .0885). 
b The predicted probability for those who received services from social aid in Cologne is significantly different from that 
of those who had no contact (p = .0132) and from those who did not receive the services (p = .0201). 
 
Table 4 - Probability of high political cynicism depending on interactions with the state (95% confidence 
intervals in brackets) 
 Cologne Geneva 
Unemployment office 82.7 [45.5, 71.1] 58.3 [70.1, 95.3] 
  No contact 76.6 [54.5, 71.4] 62.9 [69.3, 84.0] 
  Received the services 76.1 [56.4, 77.0] 66.7 [67.5, 84.7] 
  Did not receive the services     
Social aid office 77.7 [71.6, 83.8] 63.6 [57.1, 70.1] 
  No contact 78.1 [67.4, 88.9] 61.2 [44.7, 77.6] 
  Received the services 75.3 [62.5, 88.2] 65.7 [48.0,83.5] 
  Did not receive the services 82.7 [45.5, 71.1] 58.3 [70.1, 95.3] 
     
Notes: Based on a logistic regression model with political cynicism as dependent variable, controlling for sex, national-
ity, age, education, financial difficulties, political interest, associational membership, left-right self-positioning, and city. 
The model also includes an interaction term between city and contacts with welfare institutions. There are no signifi-
cant differences across groups. 
 
However, we observe different effects in the two cities, once again attesting to the 
important role played by the context for the phenomenon at hand. The results are most 
consistent with our expectations in the case of Cologne. Here the probability of high 
political efficacy is significantly lower for those who did not obtain services from the so-
cial aid office than for those who did so and also for those who did not have contact. In 
contrast, there are no significant differences when looking at the unemployment office. 
In the case of Geneva, we observe an impact of interactions with the unemployed office, 
while the social aid office does not seem to matter. More specifically, the probability of 
high political efficacy is significantly lower for those who did not obtain services from the 
unemployment office than for those who did not have contact. It should be noted, how-
ever, that in this case the difference between those who received services and those 
who did not is not statistically significant, hence somewhat weakening our findings. 
Moreover, the observed difference is significant, but only at the 10% level. 
Table 5 shows the predicted probabilities of engaging in protest depending on political 
efficacy and political cynicism. We see that, neither in Cologne nor in Geneva, these two 
measures of political alienation contribute to protest of long-term unemployed youth. If 
we now, as a last step of our analysis, put together the results concerning the impact of 
interactions with the two welfare institutions (tables 3 and 4), on the one hand, and that 
of political efficacy and cynicism on political participation (table 5), on the other hand, 
we can conclude that we do not observe an indirect – that is, interpretative – effect of 
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interactions with the state on the political participation of long-term unemployed youth. 
To be sure, not receiving the services one is entitled to matter – namely in the case of 
the social aid office in Cologne and of the unemployment office in Geneva, but we do 
not observe a statistically significant effect of political alienation on engagement in pro-
test activities. So the circle is not closed. 
 
Table 5 - Probability of engaging in protest activities depending on intervening variables related to political 
learning (95% confidence intervals in brackets) 
 Cologne Geneva 
Political efficacy     
  Low 14.2 [10.0, 18.3] 16.9 [11.9, 21.9] 
  High 15.5 [9.5, 21.4] 18.4 [11.9, 24.8] 
     
Political cynicism     
  Low  16.3 [10.0, 22.5] 19.3 [12.8, 25.8] 
  High 13.8 [9.8, 17.8] 16.6 [11.6, 21.6] 
     
Notes: Based on Appendix 2 (model 4). There are no statistically significant differences in the predicted probabilities of 
engaging in protest between low and high political efficacy or between low and high political cynicism. 
 
This is perhaps more clearly seen in table 6, which shows the changes in predicted 
probabilities of engaging in protest activities depending on the kind of interaction with 
the state, in each of the two cities, based on models 3 and 4 shown in appendix 2. This 
in a way summarizes the whole analysis concerning our second hypothesis. For each city, 
it compares the changes in predicted probabilities when we do not include the two in-
tervening variables (model 3 in appendix 2) and when we include them (model 4 in ap-
pendix 2). As we can see, the changes in predicted probabilities are nearly the same for 
both variables across models. This means that no effect is mediated by the intervening 
variables represented by the two indicators of political alienation. Thus, we could not 
provide evidence supporting the argument that interactions with the state – in particu-
lar, with welfare institutions such as the unemployment office and the social aid office – 
lead long-term unemployed youth to political learning. Their impact on political partici-
pation is rather a direct one. In addition, we find that interactions with the social aid 
office contribute to unemployed youth political participation in Cologne, while in Geneva 
this occurs through interactions with the unemployment office. Quite surprisingly, in Ge-
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neva both receiving or not the service at the unemployment office increases engage-
ment in protest activities by 10 to 15 percent, whereas in Cologne not receiving the ser-
vice from the social aid office increases it by roughly 14 percent.  
 
Table 6 - Changes in the probability of engaging in protest activities depending on interactions with the state 
 Cologne Geneva 
 
No intervening 
variables 
With intervening 
variables 
No intervening 
variables 
With intervening 
variables 
Unemployment office 
(ref.: no contact) 
    
  Received the services - 2.34 - 2.23 + 10.37* + 10.32* 
  Did not receive the ser-
vices 
+ 2.11 + 2.15 + 15.94** + 16.10** 
     
Social aid office (ref.: no 
contact) 
    
  Received the services - 2.77 - 3.05 - 4.48 - 4.51 
  Did not receive the ser-
vices 
+ 13.43* + 13.53* - 3.76 - 3.82 
     
Notes: Based on table 2 (models 2 and 3). Changes in the probability that indicate statistically significant differences 
between the category predicted and the reference category are shown in bold. 
+ p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
 
7. Discussion and conclusion 
 
Our study aimed to establish a connection between state aid and the political partici-
pation of long-term unemployed youth. Such an aid may be of two kinds: payments 
through financial aid and services through interactions with welfare institutions such as 
the unemployed office and the social aid office. We started from the assumption that 
the latter are more important, as people enter a process of political learning through 
interacting with street-level bureaucrats. Furthermore, we assumed that, from these in-
teractions, young unemployed cannot only learn whether the state is responsive or not, 
but also whether they can get something out of it. This, in turn, should positively or neg-
atively affect their propensity to engage in protest activities. In addition, we suggested 
that such a connection between the state – in particular, welfare institutions – and po-
litical engagement is mediated in two ways: by the effect of political alienation (as meas-
ured through political efficacy and cynicism) has on young unemployed, on the one hand, 
and by the impact of the different contexts in terms of unemployment policies and wel-
fare regimes, on the other. 
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Our analysis, based on survey data, leads us to conclude, firstly, that state financial 
aid and payments have no effect. Secondly, we found that interactions and services mat-
ter. Interacting with welfare institutions and especially not obtaining the services from 
them lead long-term unemployed youth to become more engaged in protest activities. 
However, this does not seem to be related to a process of political learning, as we found 
no mediating effect of political alienation. Furthermore, while in Cologne not receiving 
the services from the social aid office is associated with higher levels of political partici-
pation, as compared to both receiving the services and having no interactions with wel-
fare institutions, in Geneva what matters is the distinction between having and not hav-
ing such interactions. In Cologne, not receiving the services fosters engagement in pro-
test activities. This could be related to increased grievances as we did not find any evi-
dence of political learning. In Geneva, our finding could be due to the fact that the un-
employed youth there experienced the discretionary power of the bureaucrats and feel 
that receiving or not the services is random and highly dependent on the civil servant to 
which they are confronted (see Lorenzini, 2013 for a discussion of how unemployed 
youth perceive the attribution of active measures by unemployment office civil 
servants). In this case, it could be that receiving or not the service is not the important 
aspect, but rather the experience of the power imbalance in favor of the street-level 
bureaucrat who can decide whether or not to provide the service. Indeed, the concept 
of institutionalized citizen empowerment posits that the balance of power between cit-
izens and public institutions shape the interaction and the political learning that results 
from it (Kumlin, 2002). In particular, the presence or absence of discretionary power and 
the existence of exit options are important. Unemployment and social aid offer limited 
exit options – unless one is willing to live with no state resources. Yet, unemployment 
policies may vary in the degree of discretionary power that bureaucrats have in handling 
unemployed persons and this may affect the interactions with the state. However, we 
cannot interpret more this finding since it is hard to confront the degree of discretionary 
power across the two cases we compare.  
We believe that our study contributes to research on policy feedback by questioning 
the process of political learning. We find that interactions with the state have a limited 
effect on political learning. Long-term unemployed youth feel slightly more efficacious 
when they obtain services. However they are not more cynical when they do not obtain 
them. This finding contradicts previous research conducted in the U.S. (Soss, 1999; 
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2004). We interpret it in the light of the more comprehensive welfare state in the Euro-
pean context, which offers more developed welfare states. In this context, the learning 
process one can get from the state may be less dependent on single interactions with it, 
as in a more extensive welfare state citizens may have more contacts with multiple in-
stitutions. Thus, the interactions with one single institution provide less leverage on the 
overall evaluation of one’s ability to influence it and of the state’s responsiveness. None-
theless, we find that the interactions of long-term unemployed youth with the state af-
fect their engagement in protest activities. However, we cannot conclude whether this 
occurs through a direct effect or is mediated by political attitudes that are learned 
through a cumulative learning process taking place through interactions with different 
state agencies. Indeed, previous research shows that interactions with different institu-
tions contribute differently to political trust (Kumlin 2002). Future research should com-
bine a focus on a given social group with the study of multiple interactions with the state 
in order to test whether political learning is a cumulative process. 
In addition, our study questions the importance of distinguishing means tested and 
contributory social programs as we find that interactions with the unemployment office 
(contributory) and with the social aid office (means-tested) similarly affect protest activ-
ities when focusing on a single social group, the long-term unemployed youth, in two 
different unemployment regimes, Cologne and Geneva. This result suggests that differ-
ences across types of measures found in previous research (Swartz et al., 2009; Bruch et 
al., 2010) may rather depend on the degree of social stigma attached to the group tar-
geted by public policy. This does not mean that the design of the public policy may not 
contribute to political participation (Soss, 1999; 2004). We are not questioning the im-
plications of public policies in terms of empowerment (Kumlin, 2002), conditionality 
(Dwyer and Ellis 2009), or paternalism (Mead, 1998), but rather suggesting to refining 
how we handle the issue of self-selection. Taking into account the social stigma related 
to different population that depend on social assistance allow us to grasp more precisely 
the effects of the design of specific policies on citizens’ democratic involvement. 
In the end, perhaps the most important finding of our study is that the impact of wel-
fare institutions on the political participation of long-term unemployed youth is depend-
ent on the context. We found that in Cologne interactions with the social aid office mat-
ter, while in Geneva this role is played by the unemployed office. In addition, the impact 
of state aid on political alienation – specifically, on political efficacy – also vary across 
city. We found that the latter is enhanced by receiving the services from the social aid 
office in Cologne and from the unemployment office in Geneva. Thus, in brief, the con-
nection between welfare institutions, resources, and political learning seems to be 
strongly context-dependent.  
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Our analysis must be contextualized and qualified in at least two ways. Firstly, we have 
focused on a specific and quite peculiar form of political participation, namely engage-
ment in protest activities. Further research should examine the role welfare institutions, 
resources, and political learning for engagement in other form of participation such as 
contacting activities and most importantly voting, as well as for political participation in 
general. Secondly, we compared to specific contexts, represented by the cities of Co-
logne and Geneva. These are two cities that share a number of characteristics, but are 
also different in many respects. In particular, they both belong to the continental type 
of welfare regime, but at the same time the ways in which unemployment is dealt with 
have followed different tracks in the two cities. Again, further research should expand 
the analysis to other cities and contexts, so as to test for the robustness of our findings. 
 
 
References 
 
Almond GA and Verba S. (1963) The Civic Culture; Political Attitudes and Democracy in 
Five Nations, Princeton, N.J.,: Princeton University Press. 
Anderson CJ and Hecht JD. (2014) Crisis of Confidence? The Dynamics of Economic 
Opinion During the Great Recession. In: Bermeo N and Bartels LM (eds) Mass Politics 
in Tough Times: Opinions, Votes and Protest in the Great Recession. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 40-71. 
Arcanjo M. (2012) Unemployment Insurance Reform – 1991–2006: A New Balance 
between Rights and Obligations in France, Germany, Portugal and Spain. Social Policy 
& Administration 46: 1-20. 
Bandura A. (1997) Self-Efficacy: The Exercise of Control, New York: Freeman. 
Bonoli G. (2009) Adapting Employment Policies to Postindustrial Labour Market Risks. 
In: Giugni M (ed) The Politics of Unemployment in Europe: Policy Responses and 
Collective Action. Farnham: Ashgate, 35-51. 
Bonoli G and Mach A. (2001) The New Swiss Employment Puzzle. Swiss Political Science 
Review: 81-94. 
Bonvin J-M. (2008) Activation Policies, New Modes of Governance and the Issue of 
Responsibility. Social Policy and Society 7: 367-377. 
Jasmine Lorenzini, Marco Giugni, Welfare Institutions, Resources, and Political Learning 
 
838 
 
Bruch SK, Ferree MM and Soss J. (2010) From Policy to Polity: Democracy, Paternalism, 
and the Incorporation of Disadvantaged Citizens. American Sociological Review 75: 
205-226. 
Campbell AL. (2003) How Policies Make Citizens: Senior Political Activism and the 
American Welfare State: Princeton University Press. 
Campbell AL. (2012) Policy Makes Mass Politics. Annual Review of Political Science 15: 
333-351. 
Champion C. (2011) Switzerland: a Latecomer Catching up? In: Clasen J and Clegg D (eds) 
Regulating the Risk of Unemployment: National Adaptations to Post-Industrial Labour 
Markets in Europe. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 121-141. 
Cinalli M and Giugni M. (2013) New Challenges for the Welfare State: The Emergence of 
‘Youth Unemployment Regimes’ in Europe? International Journal of Social Welfare 22: 
290-299. 
Clasen J and Clegg D. (2006) New Labour Market Risks and the Revision of 
Unemployment Protection Systems in Europe. In: Armingeon K and Bonoli G (eds) The 
Politics of Post-Industrial Welfare States: Adapting post-war welfare states to new 
social risks. 1st ed. New York, NY: Routledge. 
Clegg D. (2007) Continental Drift: On Unemployment Policy Change in Bismarckian 
Welfare States. Social Policy & Administration 41: 597-617. 
Dalton RJ. (1996) Citizen Politics: Public Opinion and Political Parties in Advanced 
Industrial Democracies, Washington, D.C.: Chatham House. 
Dingeldey I. (2007) Between Workfare and Enablement – The Different Paths to 
Transformation of the Welfare State: A Aomparative Analysis of Activating Labour 
Market Policies. European Journal of Political Research 46: 823-851. 
Dingeldey I. (2011a) Fragmented Governance Continued: The German Case. In: Van 
Berkel R, De Graaf W and Sirovátka T (eds) The Governance of Active Welfare States 
in Europe. Houndmills, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 62-84. 
Dingeldey I. (2011b) Germany: Moving Towards Integration Whilst Maintaining 
Segmentation. In: Clasen J and Clegg D (eds) Regulating the Risk of Unemployment: 
National Adaptations to Post-Industrial Labour Markets in Europe. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 121-141. 
Dwyer P and Ellison N. (2009) Work and Welfare: The Rights and Responsibilities of 
Unemployed in the UK. In: Giugni M (ed) The Politics of Unemployment in Europe. 
Farnham: Ashgate, 53-66  
Ehrler F and Sager F. (2011) Marketization in a Federal System: New Modes of 
Governance in Unemployment insurance and Social Assistance in Switzerland. In: Van 
Partecipazione e conflitto, 8(3) 2015: 814-844, DOI: 10.1285/i20356609v8i3p814 
 
839 
 
 
 
 
Berkel R, De Graaf W and Sirovátka T (eds) The Governance of Active Welfare States 
in Europe. Houndmills, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 153-172. 
Finifter AW. (1970) Dimensions of Political Alienation. American Political Science Review: 
389-410. 
Fleckenstein T. (2012) The Politics of Labour Market Reforms and Social Citizenship in 
Germany. West European Politics 35: 847-868. 
Gallie D and Paugam S. (2000) Welfare Regimes and the Experience of Unemployment 
in Europe. Repr. ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Henn M, Weinstein M and Wring D. (2002) A Generation Apart? Youth and Political 
Participation in Britain. The British Journal of Politics & International Relations 4: 167-
192. 
Kemmerling A and Bruttel O. (2006) ‘New Politics’ in German Labour Market Policy? The 
Implications of the Recent Hartz Reforms for the German Welfare State. West 
European Politics 29: 90-112. 
Kriesi H. (2004) Political Context and Opportunity. In: Snow DA, Soule SA and Kriesi H 
(eds) The Blackwell companion to social movements. Malden, MA: Blackwell Pub., 67-
90. 
Kumlin S. (2002) Institutions-Experiences-Preferences: How Welfare State Design Affects 
Political Trust and Ideology. In: Rothstein B and Steinmo S (eds) Restructuring The 
Welfare State: Political Institutions and Policy Change. 1st ed. New York: 
Palgrave/Macmillan, 20-50. 
Kumlin S and Stadelmann-Steffen I. (2014) How Welfare States Shape the Democratic 
Public: Policy Feedback, Participation, Voting, and Attitudes. Cheltenham, UK - 
Northampton, MA, USA: Edward Elgar Publishing, 337. 
Lawless JL and Fox RL. (2001) Political Participation of the Urban Poor. Social Problems 
48: 362-385. 
Lorenzini J. (2013) Unemployment and Citizenship: Social and Political Participation of 
Unemployed Youth in Geneva. Département de science politique et de relations 
internationales. Université de Genève. 
Mead LM. (1998) Telling the Poor What to Do. The Public Interest 132: 97-112. 
Mettler S. (2002) Bringing the State Back in to Civic Engagement: Policy Feedback Effects 
of the G.I. Bill for World War II Veterans. The American Political Science Review 96: 
351-365. 
Jasmine Lorenzini, Marco Giugni, Welfare Institutions, Resources, and Political Learning 
 
840 
 
Mettler S and Soss J. (2004) The Consequences of Public Policy for Democratic 
Citizenship: Bridging Policy Studies and Mass Politics. Perspectives on Politics 2: 55-73. 
Mettler S and Stonecash JM. (2008) Government Program Usage and Political Voice*. 
Social Science Quarterly 89: 273-293. 
Meyer DS. (2004) Protest and Political Opportunities. Annual Review of Sociology 30: 
125-145. 
Nie NH, Verba S and Petrocik JR. (1979) The Changing American voter, Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press. 
Olsen ME. (1969) Two Categories of Political Alienation. Social Forces 47: 288-299. 
Pateman C. (1970) Participation and Democratic Theory, Cambridge Cambridge 
University Press. 
Perret V, Giraud O, Helbing M, et al. (2007) Les cantons suisses face au chômage : 
fédéralisme et politiques de l'emploi, Paris: L'Harmattan. 
Schneider A and Ingram H. (1993) Social Construction of Target Populations: Implications 
for Politics and Policy. The American Political Science Review 87: 334-347. 
Schneider AL and Ingram HM. (2005) Public Policy and the Social Construction of 
Deservedness. In: Schneider AL and Ingram HM (eds) Deserving and entitled: social 
constructions and public policy. Albany: State University of New York, xiii, 371 p. 
Skocpol T. (1992) Protecting Soldiers and Mothers: The Political Origins of Social Policy in 
the United States, Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. 
Soss J. (1999) Lessons of Welfare: Policy Design, Political Learning, and Political Action. 
The American Political Science Review 93: 363-380. 
Soss J. (2004) Making Clients and Citizens: Welfare Policy as a Source of Status, Belief, 
and Action. In: Schneider AL and Ingram HM (eds) Deserving and Entitled. Social 
Constructions and Public Policies. New York: Suny Press. 
Swartz TT, Blackstone A, Uggen C, et al. (2009) Welfare and Citizenship: The Effects of 
Government Assistance on Young Adults' Civic Participation. The Sociological 
Quarterly 50: 633-665. 
Teorell J, Torcal M and Montero JR. (2007) Political Participation: Mapping the Terrain. 
In: van Deth JW, Montero JR and Westholm A (eds) Citizenship and Involvement in 
European Democracies: A Comparative Analysis. London: Routledge, 334-357. 
Verba S and Nie NH. (1972) Participation in America: Political Democracy and Social 
Equality. New York ; Evanston etc.: Harper & Row, XXIII, 428 fig. 424 cm. 
Verba S, Schlozman KL and Brady HE. (1995) Voice and Equality: Civic Voluntarism in 
American Politics, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. 
Zimmermann B. (2006) Changes in Work and Social Protection: France, Germany and 
Europe. International Social Security Review 59: 29-45. 
 
Partecipazione e conflitto, 8(3) 2015: 814-844, DOI: 10.1285/i20356609v8i3p814 
 
841 
 
 
 
 
AUTHORS’ INFORMATION: 
 
Jasmine Lorenzini is currently post-doctoral researcher on the POLCON ERC Advanced 
Grant at the European University Institute in Florence. She previously worked as a post-
doctoral researcher on the LIVEWHAT project , under the coordination of Marco Giugni, 
and served as deputy lecturer at the department of political science and international 
relations where she offered a Master course on Emotions and Politics. 
 
Marco Giugni is professor of political science in the Department of Political Science and 
International Relations and Director of the Institute for the Study of Citizenship (INCITE) 
at the University of Geneva. He is also the European editor of Mobilization: An Interna-
tional Journal. His research interests include social movements and collective action, im-
migration and ethnic relations as well as unemployment and social exclusion. 
 
 
Appendix 1: Descriptive statistics 
 
 Geneva Cologne Range 
 Mean S.D. Mean S.D Min. Max. 
Dependent variable       
Protest activities 0.17 0.38 0.15 0.36 0 1 
       
Independent variables       
Financial difficulties 0.38 0.49 0.65 0.48 0 1 
No state financial aid 0.17 0.37 0.11 0.31 0 1 
Contacts with unemployment office 0.78 0.42 0.89 0.32 0 1 
No service at the unemployment office 0.38 0.49 0.43 0.50 0 1 
Contacts with social aid 0.22 0.41 0.37 0.48 0 1 
No service at the social aid 0.46 0.50 0.42 0.50 0 1 
       
Intermediary variables       
Political efficacy 0.34 0.48 0.28 0.45 0 1 
Political cynicism 0.60 0.49 0.79 0.41 0 1 
       
Controls       
Female 0.50 0.50 0.44 0.50 0 1 
National citizens 0.49 0.50 0.70 0.46 0 1 
Age 28.31 4.45 28.84 4.04 18 34 
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Primary education 0.24 0.43 0.44 0.50 0 1 
Secondary education 0.54 0.50 0.50 0.50 0 1 
Tertiary education 0.21 0.41 0.05 0.22 0 1 
Political interest 0.42 0.49 0.38 0.49 0 1 
Associational membership 0.44 0.50 0.60 0.49 0 1 
Left self-placement 0.33 0.47 0.36 0.48 0 1 
Right self-placement 0.21 0.41 0.12 0.33 0 1 
No self-placement 0.46 0.50 0.51 0.50 0 1 
Experienced discrimination related to unemploy-
ment 
0.11 0.31 0.15 0.36 0 1 
Perceived social stigma related to unemployment 6.64 2.55 7.55 2.18 0 12 
       
N 281  305    
 
 
Appendix 2: Effect of interactions with the state, political efficacy, and political cynicism on protest activities 
(odds ratios, standard errors in parentheses) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Interactions 
with the state 
    
    
State financial 
aid  
1.128 (0.461) 1.125 (0.461) 1.158 (.477) 1.156 (.478) 
Unemploy-
ment office 
(ref.: no con-
tact) 
        
  Received the 
services 
1.690 (0.272) 1.721 (0.782) 3.164+ (2.110) 3.226+ (2.158) 
  Did not re-
ceive the ser-
vices 
2.582* (0.583) 2.645* (1.194) 4.728* (3.203) 4.912* (3.339) 
Social aid of-
fice (ref.: no 
contact) 
  
  
    
  Received the 
services 
.691 (0.765) 0.676 (0.269) .687 (.400) .682 (.398) 
  Did not re-
ceive the ser-
vices 
1.678 (1.159) 1.665 (0.579) .733 (.462) .727 (.459) 
Intervening 
variables 
  
  
    
Political effi-
cacy 
  0.817 (0.219)   1.122 (.307) 
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Political cyni-
cism 
  1.128 (0.305)   .803 (.217) 
         
Control varia-
bles 
  
  
    
Woman .640+ (0.165) 0.628+ (0.163) .623+ (.163) .611+ (.161) 
National citi-
zen 
.884 (0.240) 0.889 (0.242) .849 (.232) .855 (.234) 
Age .965 (0.032) 0.966 (0.0325) .966 (.033) .966 (.033) 
Education 
level (ref.: be-
low second-
ary) 
  
  
    
  Secondary 
education 
2.188* (0.694) 2.189* (0.695) 2.222* (.714) 2.216* (.713) 
  Tertiary edu-
cation 
1.904 (0.864) 1.832 (0.836) 1.897 (.871) 1.816 (.840) 
  Financial dif-
ficulties 
1.056 (0.282) 1.067 (0.288) 1.079 (.294) 1.089 (.298) 
Political inter-
est 
2.246** (0.579) 2.179** (0.568) 2.212** (.576) 2.145** (.566) 
Associational 
membership 
1.614+ (0.417) 1.623+ (0.419) 1.617+ (.421) 1.628+ (.425) 
Left-right self-
placement 
(ref.: no place-
ment) 
    
    
  Left 2.695*** (0.744) 2.679*** (0.740) 2.785*** (.796) 2.761*** (.790) 
  Right .755 (0.321) 0.746 (0.317) .805 (.343) .790 (.338) 
Cologne .743 (0.203) 0.767 (0.212) 2.115 (1.741) 2.236 (1.857) 
Interactions         
Received so-
cial aid ser-
vices*Cologne 
    
1.083 (.868) 1.059 (.852) 
Not received 
social aid ser-
vices*Cologne 
    
3.701+ (2.870) 3.731+ (2.897) 
Received un-
employment 
    
.252 (.225) .250 (.225) 
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services*Co-
logne 
Not received 
unemploy-
ment ser-
vice*Cologne 
    
.254 (.228) .245 (.221) 
         
Chi2 (df) 
70.86 
(16) 
 71.63 
(18) 
 76.86 
(20) 
 
77.70 
(22) 
 
Pseudo R2 0.139  0.140  .151  .152  
Observations 580  580  580  580  
         
+ p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
 
 
